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PREFACE
Ludwig Wittgenstein's .Qn Certaigt:y;, recently edited by
G. H. Von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, presents philosophical difficulties which occupied its author in the last
year and a half of his life.

The theme which has been

abstracted for explication and interpretation in this essay
is his analysis of certainty as regards the existence of
physical objects, i.e. the external world.
Wittgenstein's analysis will consist in the description
of such concepts as:

0

to know", "to believe", "to be cer-

tain", "proposition", "to doubt", "to justify", "to mistaken

and physical object".

Thus Wittgenstein's analysis will

take the form of a semantic analysis of a classical epitemological problem.
The first chapter will offer Wittgenstein's positive
characterization of the cluster of epistemic concepts mentioned above.

What will be delineated are his re.flections

on prominent aspects of the structure of factual discourse.
The second chapter is a further clarif ieat.ion of his analysis of the
ter.

epis~emic

concepts described in the first chap-

aut here his analysis of the limits of factual dis-

course will be given through his criticism of G. E. Moore
and the sceptical doubts as to the existence of the external
world.

The final chapter will take up the question of the

status of propositions about the existence of the external
world in light of the above.
ii
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CHAPTER ONE
WITTGE!13TEIN'.:3 ANALYSIS OF A

CLUST"~R

OF PROMINENT

CONCEPTS

EPIST&~IC

The philosopher's task, for Wittgenstein, is to undeistand the structure and limits of thought.

The method he

used was to study the structure and limits of language.

His philosophy is a critical one.

He believed that phi-

losophers often unwittingly go beyond the bounds of language
into a kind of nonsense that

se$111S

to express genuine thought

but in fact does not do so.

Wittgenstein wanted to discover

the location of the line dividing sense from nonsense so that
philosophers might realize when they reach it and stop.

This

negative side of the philosopher•s task reveals a positive
side.

His purpose is not merely to formulate instructions

which would save philosophers from trying to say what cannot
be said in language, but also to succeed in understanding
the structure of what can be said. 1
This chapter offers a characterization of Wittgenstein's
conception of the positive side of the philosopher's task.
In the first section, his analysis of "grammar" and "criteria"

is given.

The second section centers on his clarification

of certain prominent epist.emic concepts used 1n factual dis-

course,

Wittgenstein's criticisms of G. E. Moore's rejection

of the sceptic's

argum~ts

against certainty in regard to

1 navid Pears, Lijdwig ~ittgenst!in, {New York: The Viking
Press, 1969), P• 2.
l
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t,he existence of physical objects is left to Chapter Two,
This division serves a triple purpose in the explication
o£ Wittgenstein's analysis of the status o£ propositions

about the existence or the

&Xt.ernal

world.

First, Wittgenstein himself makes no clear textual
indications as to where his criticism or others ends and
where his own positive characterisations began.

As an

aid 1n understanding his reflections such a division is

necessary.

Second, resultant upon the absence or any

such clear indicat1onal dwices, some interpretors have

taken Wit'tgenstein as a kind ot "meta-philosopher" who
is content to refute theses without replacing them with

less objectionable ones.
be corrected.

This interpretation needs to

To be sure, in his later work he does

not ofter any explicit theory

otter nwnerous descriptions

or

or

language, but he does

ordinary discourse through

which the grammar of language is revealed.

In t..11is sense,

he does otter a partial. analysis of the structure or language.

It is inlport;ant to realize this point.

Third,

and most import.ant, it 1s only by understanding his de-

scription of the structure or tactual discourse that it;
is possible to fully comprehend
his crit.icism
,

ot :::;oepti-

eia and Moore's objection to the sceptic's arguments.
It is only by understanding the st-ructure of tactual dis-

course that one can recognize the transcending o£ its
limits in the produ.otion of a subtle variety o£ nonsense.

3

SECTION I
We will now present the grammar of a cluster of interrelated concepts which are used in factual discourse.

For

Wittgenstein, the grammar of these concepts is something

like the rules by which they are used; the game in which
they are played; the logic of their functioning.

'l'hese

metaphors should be clarified before our analysis proceeds.

In Qn CertainE£, everything that is descriptive of
language-game is part of logic.(C-56) 2 Wittgenstein writes:
••• What sort of proposition is: "What could a
mistake here be like!" It would have to be a
logical proposition. But it is not a logic
which is used, because what it tells us is
not learned through propositions - it is a
logical proposition; for it does describe the
conceptual. {linguistic) situation.(C-51)

or again:
••• If "I know, etc." is conceived as a grammatical proposition, of course the "I" cannot
be important. And it properly means "there
is no such thing as doubt in this case" or
"the expression 'I do not know' makes no
sense in this case". And of course it follows
from this that 'I know• makes no sense either.(C-58)

Logical explanations, in this sense, will be descriptions
of the game, i.e. rules of the game, called language.

Exten-

ding the game analogy, one can say that logical or grammatical
descriptions are a collection of the rules by which we play

the game.
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Trans. by Denis Paul
&: G.E.M. Anscombe and editea by o.s.M. Anscombe &: G.H. Von
Wright, (New York: J. & J. Harper Edition, 1969). Note: All
further references
to On ....._1
Certainty
appear in the paper proper
....
__ .__J__
..... _
..!3f"f'6,...~.f,,.,....,.

I"\

""""..,,...,,..~_.,....,..~""

....... \...

._.. .....

~--
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•
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Here Wittgenstein finds a correspondence between
"rules" and ''meaning". {C-62)

kind of ellployment of it.

"A meaning of a word is the

For it is what we learn when

the word is incorpora:ted into our language•. {c-61}

Here

is strong textual support for t'Jle relatedness of "grammar",
"meaning",

0

rule", "logic", and "language-game".

Furthermore the relatedness of these concepts can be
shown in that the concept "grammar", supported by these
related

conc~pts,

is of prime importance in Wittgenstein's

attitude towards the claim of formal logic to be sole ax-

biter of s1gni£icance in discourse.

The thesis that logie

nw.st operate according to strict rules, with no vagueness
or imprecision, is attacked in .Qn. QertaY'Jtz (sections 26-

6;).

In place of the mathematical exactitude of formal

logic Wit,tgens i..ein emphasises ••grammar", which rests upon
agreement in the way people aet, upon a form of life.
These remarks will be presupposed in the following discussion.

Thus about a proposition of which its opposite

is self-contradict.ory wittgenstein does not, in

.P..i:

~J!£1Caint,z,

say that they are ,.analytic" or *'tautological", these terms
being reminiscent

or

his earlier Traetatus and formal logic -

but that they are "grammatical".
In this essay we shall utilize a logical tool which is

not mentioned in .Qn Cer!eaintx.

terion",

'L'his is t..lie concept "cri-

This concept, first fo.rmulated in the .!UY.I and

Brown 3ooy, is used extensively in the
Invyti.gati2ns.

PhUogoP!!ig~

5

Within these works "grammar" and "criterion° are
ref erred to in order to decide about the propriety ot an
utterance,.

'l'he expression "crit;erion" is connected to

t.he question of the propriety o£ same of these utterences

or about the circumstances in which some utterence is
appropriate.

In the

Mt.Iestiga~ion§,

when he discusses

the grammar of' "to fit", "to be able .. , and "to undeistandf', he \'fTites:
••• The criteria which we accept for ••fitting11 ,
••being able to", '*understanding'", are much more

complicated than might appear at first.

That

is, the game_with these words, their employment

in the lingU.1stic intercoarae that is oarried
on by their means• is more involved - the role
of these words in our language other than we
are tempted to think.)

As we will show, the grammar of "to believe", "to

know", are essentially related to the criteria for the
normal utterance of "I believe that ••• " and "I know
that ..... So though Wittgenstein does not use the expres-

sion "criterion" there is overwhelming textual evidence
to show that it in no way distorts the explication of his
analysis.

Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein's

understanding of t.he concept "proposition" is partially an
extension and

developm~t

of the concepts "criterion" and

31.udwig Wittgenstein, Philgyoehig~ ~figati2!}s,

Trans. by G.Z.r>l. Anscombet '(f~eworlhe~!an Company,

195$), section 182.

6

.aetore o£ter1ng the distinctive .featuru of .. criterion"•
a brief' description should be given.

Wittgenstein opposes

the concept •criterion" to the concept ..a?.11.ptoul•.

To the

question "How do you know that so-and-so is the case?"•

Wittgenstein writes that we sometimes answer by giving
"criteria" and sometimes by giving "symptoms".

In the

lUl!!

Jm.4 1£2.YB bJss he uses as an example an in.f'lamation caused
by

a part.ieular bacillus called angina.

"Why do you say this nr.an has got angina?•

To the question
The answer "lie

has the bacillus so-and-so 1n his blood" gives the criterion

tor angina.

It "11•

answer was •His throat was inflauaed.•,

this mj.ght be a symptQ.Ul of angina.
Wittgenstein regard.a "s71Dpt011" as a phenomenon which
past experience has shown that 1t coinoided, in some way

or other, with the phenomenon which is the criterion.

To

say "A man has angina i f this bacillus is .found in him" is
a loose way of giving the naeaning of the concept angina.
But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed

throat" is to make a hypothesis. 4
4Ludw1g Wittgenstein• ~~d ~ Boak@; (New Yorks
Harper & Brothers, l9S8), PP• 4"== •

7
Now we tux-n to \he discription ot the dist.inotive
feat,urea of •criterion".

We will draw upon the work done

by N. Garver in his calrification of the concept "ori'terion" • .5
But we shall use texu cited .trom.Qn Cl.CtaYJt1, in support
of Garver's
by

t,he

und~s'tanding

of this concept as wa.e developed

Wittgenstein in the Phiiosophigf:Y, .Iny!§tigation§ and

.m,.u .!!14

Brow

ll2W •

If one asks someone what kind of thing a criteria is,

tor the other to say that it 1s an instrument of a certain
sort would be a good introduc1;0ry answer.

Wi'ttgenstein

follows the basic dictionary definition or a criterion as

a test or standard or canon of oorrect,ness.
One can now ask, What these instruments are for?

Jal

In

Ce£li!!nty, Wit'tgens'tein offers criteria for a variety

of ditf erent 'things& for a person knowing something, for
being in a st.ate of conviction, for a person believing
something, for calling a particular tree a cedar t,ree, e'tc.
Wittgenstein's criteria have their application in connection
wi1ih linguistic expressions.

When he describes th• criteria

;Newton Garver, "Wittgenstein On Criteria," in ~owl11dg!
;!d ~~imce, edited tr.t D.D. Rollins, (Pittsburgh: niveistyo !ttsliurgh Press, 1964}, pp • .55-71. For a comprehensive bibliography of work done on the notion of "criteria"
see w.G. Lycan, ..!fonindu.ctive Evidences Recent work on
Wi&tgenatein's 'Criteria'!" in }unerig!Q Phi~os2phic!Jr guerttrlr,
Vol. a, No. 2, 1971, PP• 22-5.

r
for a person's believing something, it must be recalled

that it is short hand for th• criteria for the use of
such expressions as "I beli.ve that......

That is, cri-

teria do not determine the empirical tact that A believes,
but We "meaning" o!' "A believes*, and this .foras part
of the grammar 0£ "to believa•.(c-61)

The utterances tor which there are criteria are
those stat•en:ts whioh the speaker has same

war

ot knowing

to be true or t"alse or which he might justify by reterence
to something other than what is stated in his utte.ranoes.(0-14)
All utterances ot tl11s sort have criteria governing their

Once it is agreed that criteria govern 'the use ot

use.

certain lingu.istie exprassions, it is reasonable to ex-

pect that they govern t.he use of all those utterances that
make statements which the speaker can know, justity or

verify.(C-l.05)
In that eritex-ia. are human instruznentta, criteria are

always the criteria of some person or group of persons.
This is an important point t,o emphasise in that one will
not con.fuse criteria with necessary and sufficient oondi-

tions.

It is absuro to suppose that for one person title

necessary and $u!'f1aient,condit1ons for a cedar tree growing would be different than for ano'tiher person.
sary

The neces-

and sut.ficient conditions are something in 'the world,

9

they are not a matter of linguistic convention.

With

criteria the case is different, there may be a dive:rgency among people, social groups or cultures.
Criteria are arbitrary, in the sense that there
need be no justification for criteria being what
are.

t.~ey

The whole point of criteria is that they dete:r-

mine what we say.(C-105)

To use the rule analogy for

a moment, a rule indicates what we are to say.

One

needs no reason for following such a rule as we do;
rather one is trained to follow it when we learn the
language.(C-2u5}
Criteria are internalized in linguistic practice,
and the people who use them may be quite unable to say
what they are.

Using Ryle's distinction between "knowing

how" and "knowing that .. , one can say that after children
have been trained in the use of linguistic expression$,
they are still unable to explicate the grammar of their
language 1n Wittgenstein's sense.(C-95}
These criteria are generally rough and imprecise;
it is their regular use and acknowledgment, rather than

precision which makes tJlem useful.

To say they are im-

precise is only in light, of a purity which had been demanded by the Wittgenstein of the Traqtat'S§•

They are

as precise as they need be for human communication.

lO

The roughness of criteria can be delineated in two
ways.

First, the crit.eria for .,I know that ••• 0 determine

the sorts of things that would show "I know that ••• "

is

true or false; and to say whether some set of circumstances
are of this sort or not requires discrimination t,hat is
not determined by the criteria and is only given in practice. (C-29)

l'he second way in which the roughness of

criteria shows itself is in one's inability to say exactly
what the criteria are even for simple utterances.
stein writes1

Wittgen-

"Am I not getting closer and closer to

saying that in the end logic cannot be described?

You

must look at the practice of language, then you will see

it."(C-501)
Criteria presuppose circumstances of application.
This characteristic is apparent in cases where there are
many different criteria for a linguistic expression.

The

vast majority of concepts have several complementary
criteria.
Furthermore there may be a fluctuation between the
criteria tor a linguistic expression and symptoms or evidence for it.

"The same proposition may get treated at

one time as something to be tested by experience at another
'

as a rule of testing".(C-109)

But it would be incorrect

to say that there were only symptoms or evidence.

r
ll

Wittgenstein's understanding ot the concepts "grammar"
and "criteria• have now been explicated.

\•ie are now in

a position to offer a detailed account

or

certain prominent epistemic concepts.

His analysis will

his analysis of

present a partial description of the grammar, i.e. use of
these concepts through a presentation of theRcriteria.
SECTI01~

II

We will start our examination of Wittgenstein's
analysis with the concept ..to know", then go on to "to
believe", "to doubt", ttto be certain", and *'proposition".
This is not to say that we will not have cause to note
his analysis of othor concepts in the clarification of'
the above.

The explication will be somewhat reoonstructive.

because many of the linguistic situations are of the
author's i.."1vention.

Those situations have been developed

out of t.>iose given by Wittgenstein in his s001ewhat abbreviated style.

They have no distorting etreot on the

doctrine presentecil the doctrines are Wittgenstein's.
Wittgenstein offers n\.l.merous oammonplaoe situations
in which the conoept "to know" is used.

He is concerned

with revealing the linguistic presupposition ot these
'

situations.

In presenting the linguistic presupposition,

he will delineate the criteria for its use.
off.r a partial description
of this concept.

or

Thus he will

the grammar or t.he meaning

12

One of the first moves in his anal.ysis to show that
when one u:t't#ers the expression nI know that ••• ", one is

not referring to one's mental state.

One is doing some-

thing, not describing what one is doing.
know seems

to

what is known,

describe a state
~antees

or

He writes•

"I

affairs whieh guarantees

it as a f'act..

One always forget.s

the expression •I thought I knew• ... (C-12)
How does he go about showing this?
lowing ai'tllation1 call it SituationJ:.

the fol-

A. "That 1a a new

a. "Ho,

police a.:raow.-ad personnel. carrier."
A. *'I know that it is.

Im•~ine

it isn't."

Look at the emblem of the Chicago

Police Department." B. ttOh, now I see itl" One of th•
ways someone would say that an.other person knows something
is tha't tha:t person is ready to give grounds for what he

knows.

To use the upreesion "I know that ..... , one haa

tfo be able, i t requ•ted, to tell how one knows.(C-484)
'

On the other hand, i f sp.av A could not tell "how
he

knows", one would rebuke him tor saying that he knew,

tttou didn't know at all.a Here the

One of' the criterion
"I kn.ow that ••• tt

a

ror

r~seion

'th• use

or

•I know

the expression

that , one is ready and oan, 1f' ao ra-

qu.ated, •tat• his grounds, or ..how I know... P\lt more
formally, "'I know -that ... ' in cont,at l, 1s being ready,
i t requested, to state ones

grounda".(C-18)

r
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A final interesting, and L11portant point about this
illustration.

Speaker A's original utterance asserted

something being the case, i.e. that the vehicle is a
police personnel carrier.

'l'his statement was reasserted

B.

in his reply to speaker

In both utterances the ooi-

rectness of the statement depends on tJ>.e evidence which

is ofi'ered.
When questioned, speaker A uttered "I know that ••• ".
This expression is used at t.imes when there is some question as regards the correctness or the statement.

Notice

tJ>.at this has little to do with the correctness of the

"I know that ••• " does not guarantee that t.he

statement.

statement is correct.

It ju.st doesn't function that way.

Imagine the following situation• call it Sitllation 2.

A. "Is that a cedar tree over there (pointing to a tree)?"

B. "I know that it is,

When I was a boy we had two of

them in our front yard.

Now look at the shape of the

leaves."

A. "Yes, its true, the leaves are •• ,".(C-176)

Speaker A posed the question whe'ther the tree could or
couldn't b• called a cedar tree.

Speaker B, in answering

th• question, did at least two things.

First, he offered something from his pa.st experience
'

which would allow him
things.

w be

in a position to know such

He was brought up with cedar trees.

Second, he

offered evidence for calling this tree, here and now, a

cedar tree.

14
However, i f speaker B was not in a position to know

what he says he knows, A would not accept this statement
that "he knows that......

Consider the situation where

two friends are playing t:he stock market.

Speaker A has

played it £'or years, but speaker B is having his first
go ati it.

The stock B buys advances significantly, and

he says• "I knew it would." Spealcer A then respon•s,
"The hell you didJ it's only a lucky guess."
Returning to
by

§iYJ!a~qn ~2·

The evidence is accepted

speaker A as showing that the statement is true.

ovidenoe is all that is needed in this situation.

This
U

speaker A still was not eonvinced that this waa all that
was needed to show that 1ihat was a cedar tree, he would

ask for further evidence.
it.

Speaker B would hav• o.f'£ered

Note that th$l"'e must be the possibility of deciding

the truth or f'alsity 0£ the statement.

U speaker

B could

not have shown that it was true, speaker A would not have

accepted B'a statement that he knew.
More formally, it can be put as followst "I know, in
cont.ext 2, means that there

a

a possibility ot showing

that p is 1U'Uen.(C-24))

Now consider the following
situation• call it SJtQ!,

!tW!l l•

It takes plaoe at a cock-tail party. A. *'Haven'tt

I met you be.fore?" B. "No, I don't think so".
have, in Bulgaria".

B. *'Not you couldn*t have.

A."Yes, I
I hav•

15
never been there".

A. "Why yes I have met youn.

B. "No,

I know that you ha.ven•ti I have never been out o£ North

America!"

In this situation, it ia 1.mponant to observe

that wht:m speaker B stated •I know t.hat ••• " it was not an
expression ot his readiness for his stateiaent
firmed.

1;0

be

oon-

He was not expressing his willingness to have

hie grounds or evidence checked for their tNthf'ulnesa.
I£ he had, he mig.bt have said "I believe t.hat I have never

been ou:t ••• "

Rather, "I know that ••• ,. implies ...,_wUder-

men t" if what he said was not confirmed.(0-J).3)
stein writ.es of the use

or "I

Wittten-

know that ..... in situations

like J, "I know• I am familiar with it as a oert.ain'tiy."(C-272)
In completing our r•construction of Wittgenstein•s
analysis of the ooncept "l ilnow", consider the following

§itw!l.ieB

~·

A. "I know tba't that's a
cedar u-ee over there." B. "You really believe that?"

situa1aont oaU it

A. nyea, look at the way the leaves area shaped." Our
.first point 1s that when speaker A states "I know.. , he
also is willing to stat,e •1 believe... (0-171)

It might be objected that though "I believe" and "I
know1' assert the aatQe airtatement, they exclude one another.
If

"I know p" it would.

~

wrong £or me to say uI believe p•,

because this woul.d suggest that I do not. know it.

If', in

knowing p, I am asked whether I believe p, I would retort,

. 16

nNo, I know P"•

But this is not a serious objection.

In

a parallel case, I would mislead someone if I described
my parents as people I live with.

Asked whether they are

people I live with I would say, "No, they are my parents".
Nevertheless I live with my parents.

What is true is

that I do not merely live with them.

Similarly, if "I

know p", ! do not merely believe p, but still "I believe

p."(C-425)
A more powerful argument against a criterion for the
use

of the concept "I know• in terms of "I believe" is

that people can, it seems, know something to be the ease
and yet re.fuse, or seem Wl&ble, to bring themselves to

believe it.

A mother who is told by a reliable witness

with a great deal of circumstantial detail that her child

has been murdered by being pushed into a river by another
child might be in such a situation.
approach

~

Wittgenstein's

this di.f.ficulty is to say that. although she

has conclusive grounds for believing that her child is
dead, she does not, in fact, believe it or know it.

To

have compelling grounds is one thing, but t.o recognize
them as compelling is another thing. (C-2.)9)
Witt.genst,ein has partially described the speaker's

use

or

tions.

'

the concept "to knowtt in cODSmon linguistic situaFrom his analysis we have .formulated the following

points about the grammar

or

this expression.

"'I know',

17
in common linguistic contexts, means being able, if

requested, to state one's grounds for Pt to show the
possibility

o:f

p being true, to offer one•s position

for knowing p, and to believe P"•

It has also been

shown, that '"I know that ... , in situation J, means

"an unwillingness to have one's grounds for p, ones
position tor p, the t.ruth of p, and the belief in p,
testeda", though in the other situations there is an

implied willingness to entertain the possibility of
th• statement being mistaken.

Furthermore, it is interesting that one uses the
expression in situations where there is a possibility

ot a contradiotion or questioning on the part of
another.(C-424)

When there is no question, or no

wish to emphasize linguistically what one is about,

the expression "I know" is not used.
This observation should not be considered a criticism.

That one doesn't utter the expression in speaking

about what is the case is not a shortcoming or lack of
exactitude on our part.

Rathert people communicate

tacts about the WO:"ld and themselves to one another.
It is accepted t*lat when ?ne communicates £acts one

knows these tacts to be true.
discourse is for.

This is what tactual
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We have already mentioned the expression "to believe••.
It was shown that the criteria. for the use of the expression

"I know that ••• "

is related to that of the expression

"I

believe that ...... 'the latter is similar to the form.er in
that neither ia a description of one•s mental state.(C-42)
It is not an expression ref erring to an inner process.

Observe the following situation: call it

A. •1 believe that John is coming...
going out of town...
model".(C-42)

B. "No, he said he was

A. "I know he is.

coming llP 'the street".

~ityatiM ;j:•

There is his car

B. "No, it is not.

That is a newer

It is important to note that in this illus-

tration the truth of speaker A's stat•ent was in question,
but that he believed it wasn't.

When a person objects to

another believing a statement, he says "You shouldn•t believe that ••• ", and not "You don•t believe that ••• •.

One can ask. it one is curious or genuinely interested
in the truth of a statement made, "How do you know?..

It

is never asked, "How do you believe?" One mu.st state how
he is in a position tor making the statement and one must
state hie grounds for the truth o:t the statement.

If

these two conditions are not satisfied one will say, ttYou
don't know at aU•.
One does ask, "Why do you believe?"; but never, "Why

do you know?"

Here it 1s not necessary that one gives his
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groW'lds, or i.f one does, they can be scattered references.(<:-550)
The use of the expression "I believe that ••• " does not
have, as one of it;s linguistic presuppositions ·the possibility of o!'fering one's grounds or evidence".
portant to realize this.

It is im-

What one believes about the

world are the sorts of things which are "groundless".(C-166)
They are the sorts of things that have no special way of

being tested.

Furthermore, one doesn't say, "He is in a position

to believe that." Rather one says, "It is reasonable to
assume

that in this situation ••• ••

It is not part of cri-

teria for the use of "I believe that ••• " that one can
give one's position for believing a statemsnt.

However,

it is possible that one can decide whether it is reasonable
in such-and-such a situation to assume this or that with
confidence.

This is the case even though what ie believed

is false.(C-556)
In summation, one believes

~

other is true, or that some state
not the ease.

or

some statement or
a.ff airs is or is

"I bol1eve that ••• " is followed by an as-

sertion, i.e. a statement.

It was shown that ttI believe

that ••• " means "that one can st.ate why one holds the
statement, though it is not necessary to off er grounds
.for the truth of the statement".

Though part of the cri-

teria of "I believe that ••• " is not "being in a position",
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one can and does speak of it "being reasonable in sucha.nd-such a situation to assume the statement."
It is important to recognize that people act accord-

ing to a system of propositions which are believed, but

they very rarely verbally formulate these.
what people transmit in a certain manner.

One believes
In this way

geographical, historical, religious, and psychological
facts are communicated.(C-170)

As a child, by instruction

and observation, one is taught to accept these things and
act upon them.

One is initiated into a culture unified

by science and education.
To see that this is an initiation, a form of ritualized training, imagine a child in the following classroom
situation {Situation 6), questioning a particular geographical proposition which is held as true.
know that corn is grown in Indiana?"

A. "How do we

B• .. Well, this book

was written by a man who knows these things."

A. "But do

we have to believe that just because he writes ••• "

B. "You

will never learn geography if you don't stop asking such
silly questions!"(C-283)

One is taught "to believe in" a

vast number of things and, only after one accepts and
acts upon this system, is one allowed to question some
propositions within it.

In "knowing that ••• " and "believing

that" p is the case, and conversely to "doubt that" p is
the case, one is first taught "to believe in" an entire
system of propositions.(C-114)

2l

One final comment before proceding to Wittgenstein's
analysis of the concept "to doubt".

First "I believe

that ••• " and "I believe in ••• " are used in situations
where there are needs for verbal stage-setting.

When

people communicate facts to one another, as we have seen,.
they a.re expected to communicate what they know.
what factual discourse is all about.

This is

Usually there is no

need to position utterances with the expression .. I know
that ••• .,.

Similarly, people are expected t.o believe the

facts they know.

They act like persons act when they

believe and at times can be said to know what they believe.

Sometimes this activity takes the form of verbal

utterances, that one believes certain facts.
Wittgenstein's analysis of the axpression "to doubt••
has already been introduced in illustration 6.

The ques-

tioning of the child was countered by the teacher's
offering grounds for the truth of her original statement.
Yet when the child continued in his doubt about the truth
of these groWlds, the teacher rebuked him. for his nonsensical question.(C-JlO)

The teacher didn't answer the

child's question because within the context his doubt was
a groundless one.

The child was doubting what had to be
'

accepted in learning geography.

Obviously when one uses

the expression "I doubt that ..... one must "offer his particular groWlds for questioning".(C-122)

It should also
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be noted that

~'I

doubt that ••• ff functions in a similar way

to "I know that.ff or "I believe that••, in that it does not
offer a description of a mental state of affairs.

Rather,

it is part of an activity which we call "doubting a par-

ticular proposition which purports to be a statement about
the world".(G-359)
In the following explication, we will want to separate

doubts of three different sorts:

those which are reason-

able, those which are unreasonable, i.e. superfluous, and
finally those doubts which are logically impossible, i.e.
doubts which are no doubts at all,(C-453)

This last sort

of doubt will be given only a preliminary description.

The

full import of it can only be understood in relation to
Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore's article on the "Proof
for the existence of the external world".

z.

Imagine the following situation: call it §ixuation
A. "We can explain the rise in food prices by increased
expenditures for t.he ·war effort."

B. "No, we cannot.

If'

you look at the statistics from 1950-2 you will see that
our involvement in Korea ••• "

A. "This is true, but ••• ".(C-335)

Here is the normal give and take of a statement asserted
and doubts raised as to its truthfulness.

Speaker B ex-

presses doubts about the statement, speaker A makes and
off era his grounds or evidence for the falsity of the
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In this case one would say that speaker B

statement.

offered his doubts and showed the reasonableness of this
doubt by stating his evidence.
that ••• •, in context

a,

More formally, "'I doubt

is being able, it requested, to

offer one's grounds against the truth of the statement."
It is also interesting to note that the reasonableness of
the grounds is contingent upon speaker A accepting the
evidence.

But this is not contingent upon any decision

on speaker A's part.(C-271)

Statistical evidence is what

is called "good grounds" in economics.

As a student

speaker A was taught to accept this type of evidence as
good evidence.(C-608)
Using the same illustration, a third party joins the
conversation.

c.

"Gentlemen, Gentlemen, it seems to me

that your discussion is a fruitless one."

A. and B. •'Why?"

C. ''Your use of statistics invalidates your so-called explanations".

A. ••we realize that the statistical method

has many shortcomings such as ••• , but we take these into
account when using them".

c.

"Yes, but you can never get

to the truth with a mere correlation of a certain limited
set of phenomenon".

B. "Your doubts are unacceptable.

To

be sure we don•t get all the facts for some ideal explanation.

But this is the truth as far as we can know it".

this discussion a further step has been taken.
questioner has offered

doub~s

In

Our third

not only of the wvidence or

grounds for the truth of a sta'tement, but has also rejected
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the method for obtaining the truth of statement and others
similar to it.
In response to speaker C's objections, speaker A and

B accept the difficulties involved in the use of the statistical method, but have no better one to offer.

They

will call speaker C's doubts unreasonable and wiacceptable
for he off era grounds which have been considered before
by the two researchers.

Speaker C only offers the possi-

bility of doubting as the ground for overthrowing a methodological principle in search of ideal explanations.
This possibility has not been found acceptable for there
are no grounds for it.

It is "merelyw possible.(C-392)

A fourth party joins our group.

D. "It seems to me

that the whole of the previous discussion is futile.

The

explanation you seek, the principles you use, 'the evidence you off er are all quite meaningless to the real
question."
your attack.

c.

"Well• well, it's difficult to respond to

I don't know really where to begin.

not exactly sure what you mean.

I'm

In what way is it mean-

ingless?". ( C-24)
What is of interest in this conclusion to the illustration is that speakers A, B, and C are confronted with
one who objects 00 the totality of principles• propositions,
evidence, etc., which is called the "science of economics."
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They find it difficult to engage in a discussion with
their objector in that they are not clear in what way
they should "argue" for the truth of their science.
Indeed, what would count as "true" for them does not
seem to hold for their objector.
To "argue" one uses certain principles, propositions,
evidence, etc., in supporting or denying a proposition
or set of them.
tation.

But here there is no method or argumen-

One is not sure what ••argument" means here.

What is asked for is an explanation of the meaning of D's
utterances.

IT one cannot be assured of an aacepted

base for speaking for or against certain propositions,

can one be assured of the meaning of the objector's
utterances?(C-456)

To be more precise, can what the

objector is doing be called "dout>ting"?

We had offered

the aspects of the criteria for saying that "He is doubting" in our .first two parts of this illustration.

w;hat

speaker D is doing seems to be something similar to
this

yet we would not want to call this "a doubt".

Perhaps speakers A, B, and C would conclude that speaker
D was "mentally upset".

They would suppose that normal

people do not doubt like

~hat.(C-255)

We now turn to Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept
"to be certain .. ,

No better introduction could be given
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concerning the question, "What is meant by the truth of
tho proposition •1s certain •7•• than \lw'hen Wittgenstein
writes:
••• With the word '*certain" we express complete
conviction, the total absence of doubt and
thereby we seek to convince ot~er people. 3ut
when is something objectively certain? When a
mistake is not possible. .But what kind of
possibility is that? ~Iustn't a mistake be
logically excluded?(C-194)

This distinction that Wittgenstein draws is remini-

scent of one given ·1n historical introductions to the

problem of certitude.

That is, "certainty" has been

taken to be either a state o:f' mind or a relational property of propositions or statements.

The task now is

to separate and delineate these two sorts of certainty.
To see this obsene the following situation: call
it ~~1;)&a-X,ign .~.

A. "Is that a oedar tree over there?"

B• .,Yes, it is.

I am certain that it is.

Look at .....

Here "I am certain that ..... functions in a way similar to

"I am sure ••• ", "I am familiar ••• ", and "I am comfortable
with ••• ", in that speaker B was offering how he was

holding "that is a cedar treett.(C-194)
It should be noted. that in this illustration speaker
B's holding the statement as certain was not a condition

frOll'l which he inferred the truth of the statement.

Ra-

ther, he offered his grounda to A for the truth of the
statement.
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These grounds a.re ones which could be subject to dispute,
and B could be mistaken.

So the use of' "I am certain that"

is not a condition f'or the truth of' the statement, though
it is a description of how B holds the statement,(C-)0)

Following Witt-gen.stein, it was stated that "I am
certain that ••• • is a psychological concept used in a
description of one's relation to an assertion.

Now it

can be asked what are the criteria tor the identification

and ascription of this expression to a person? One will
•ay that "he is certain that ••• • when the speaker acts

as one "who does DOt have the slightest doubt that that
is a cedar treeJ that he is convinced that that is a
cedar tree and will attempt to convince others in his
particular situation that that is a cedar tree."
It one didn't behave in a way similar to the above

when he uttered the expression •r am certain that ••• •,
one would say that this person was lying or didn't understand the meaning of his words.

Imagine a ticket agent

who stated that he was certain that the train would arrive

at 10105 1 yet, while saying this, he was hurriedly looking
up time schedules, rubbing his head, sitting in an uneasy

position, etc.

One would say that perhaps he uttered the

expression as a joke in revealing that he wasn•t really
certain at all when the train would arrive.

· 2a
In this regard, i f one ut'tered a statement without

the linguistic cue "I

aai

cert.a.in that ••• " and if ones

behavior was similar to the eriterion of'.fered above, one

could say "he is certain that ••• "

In other words, the

utterance of the expression "I am certain that ••• tt is
only one of the criteria for people engaged in "certainty
behavior".

Wittgenstein otf ers another way of understanding the

concept "to be certain".

This is "Objective Certainty",

where a mistake about the truthfulness of propositions is
"logically" ex.eluded.

The linguistic game in which speakers

part.icipate ex.eludes certain sorts of propositions within
it trom being mistaken.

It one doesn't hold these sorts

of propositions as being certain then he would not be
playing the game according to the rules.{C-446)
What is here described is not the use of "to be cextain" as in "I am certain that ••• " which is a description
of a "psychological state", but rather that, 'the growids
for 'the tNthf'ulness of propositions are certain, i.e.,
"It. is certain that ••• ".

Tba't the grounds for the state-

ment are certain is not something any particular person
can decide upon.

Rather it is determined by the game they

are involved in. (c-;6)

On the relationship between pro-

positions which a.re certain and the use o£ .. I am certain
that ••• " Wittgenstein writes that they just hang together.(0-31))

29
For a clearer understanding of this, observe the
following: {l) "I am certain that is a cedar tree", and
{2) "I am certain that I am R.M."

It has already been

shown that in uttering (1), the speaker was describing
how he holds to this proposition, yet the proposition's
truthfulness is veri.fied by ascertaining whether the
grounds that the latter offers are sufficient.

If

speaker A questioned the truth of the statement, speaker A wasn't questioning whether speaker B in tact held
the proposition as a certainty, i.e. whether he believed
it was certain.

It could turn out that they may look

closer at the tree and discover that it wasn't a cedar
tree at all.

Here and in many other like situations

mistakes are possible and do occur.
Now imagine the following situation1 call it SituatiQn

2· A man receives a caller at his home. The caller

questions him in regard to his identity.
B. "Are you really?"

A. "I am R.M."

A. "I am certain of it.

I lived

here for the las't five years, here comes my wire.
must be a friend's prae'tical joke•.

This

B. "No it isn't.

I

would off er evidence that you really are not who you say
you are."

A. "I refuse to allow any such thing.

whole thing is absurd".(C-577)

This

In this situation speaker

A refuses to accept any evidence to the eftect that he is
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not R.M.(C-381)

To give up or entertain as doubt.ful his

identity, speaker A would have to question a set of related propositions which he also holds as eertain• i.e.

where he lives, how old he is, what he does for a living,
etc., and speaker A will not allow this.

For speaker A

ev•rything, i.e. all his past experiences, speak in favor
of his being R.M. and nothing speaks against it.

These

would conclusively prove that he is 1n faot R.M.(C-594)
That. these grounds are conclusive is premised on the
f

aot that people a.re brought up to accept many proposi-

tions as certain, and the grounds which one has for them

are considered conclusive.

In normal circumatances people

know with a maximum degree of certainty what their names
are, where they live, what they do for a living, and one
doesn't doubt in normal circumstances that they could be

"mistaken" about these things.(C-529)

If

one was mistaken

about where he put his keys this is nothing unusual, but
what would one say of a person who was mistaken about his

identity? Would one say that he made a ..mistake" in the

same sense as being mistaken about his keys?(C-JOO)

No

one just. doesn't make mistakes about ones identity.

To clarity this last point, Wittgenstein obser'tes
'

that mistakes not only have a. "cause•, but they also have
a "ground".(C-74)

When scxneone makes a mist.alee it can in
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most circumstances be fitted into what he knows.

If

one is •mistaken" about where he left his keys, he still
knows he is in the right house, he knows that he has

just come home from work, etc.

Here there is a mistake

about one particular point within a field or points.
However, the ease of s0B1eone who made a "mistake" about
his identity is different.

Jim Smith said he was Jesus

Christ and lived in Galilee. ( c-67)

He would be "mistaken"

about his whole field and not just one or a couple of
points within it.

called "insanity".

au.t

this kind of ''mistake" is usually

One would say perhaps that he was

*'temporarily confused and disorient,ed" and this is not
a

"mistake".(C-71)
Completing our explication or Wittgenstein's analysis

of structure of certain epistemic concepts, his grammatical
description of the concept t•proposition" will now be given.

Wittgenstein writes that "our 'empirical propositions' do
not form a homogeneous ma.ss".(C-21.3)

He says "Here one

must, I believe, remember that the concept 'proposition'
itself is not a sharp one".(C-J20)

Finally Wittgenstein

says "It is clear that our empirical propositions do not
a.ll have the same status., •• ",(C-167)

Before entering into a detailed analysis of the concept "proposition" we will offer the root metaphors that
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Wittgenstein uses as the point of departure for his logical
analysis.

By root metaphor, what is meant is a somewhat

systematic report,oir of ideas by means of which Wittgenstein
describes, by analogical extension, the concept ttproposition•• where these ideas do not immediately and literally
apply.
First, Wittgenstein's use of the River Metaphor.

He

writes:

••• It might be imagined that some propositions
the form ot empirical. propositions, were
hard and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but
.fluidf and that this relation al't#ered with
time, in that fluid propositions hardened and
hard onea become fluid.{C-96)

or

Furt,her:

••• And the bank of that river consists partly

ot hard rock, subject to no alteration or

only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand,
which now in one place now in another gets
washing away or depoeited.(C-99)
T'aen there is the picture metaphor.

Wittgenstein

writes that "Th• truth of certain empirical propositions
belongs to our frame or reterence".(C-83)

And againi

••• But I did not get my picture of the world
or its correctness1 nor
do I have it because I am satisfied of its
correctness. Not it. ia the inherited background against whici\ I distinguish between
true and false. (C-99)
by satisfying myself
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Finally:
In general I take as true what is found in

text-books of geography for e.."<am.ple. Why?
! aay: all these facts have been confirmed
a hu..11dred times over. But how do I know
that? What is my evidence for it? I have
a world-picture. Is it true or false?
Above all it is the substratum of all my
inquiring and asserting. The propositions
describing it are not all equally subject
to testing.(C-162)

Here Wittgenstein is not so much arguing a position
for the correct description of the concept "proposition",
as attempting to change a philosopher's associations
whieh surround the mention of this concept.

What gener-

ally are these associations?

It is that propositions aret (L) Analytic, or the
truth of the proposition is determined by the meaning of
the terms which constitute the proposition.

Thus nsache-

lors are unmarried males" is true because "unmarried male"
defines or is a logically essential characteristic of
"bachelor."

The relationship which obtains between the

propositions "John is a bachelor• and ..John is an ummarried male•• is one of logical entailmentJ and (,_) Synthet,ic,

or the truth of the proposition is determined by its method of veri:f"ication.

Synthetic propositions give one in-

formation about tho world, and the relationship between
any two ot them is a eontengent rather then logical one.

Wittgenstein suggests, in the above, that there are
propositions which at the surface appear to be empirical
lOYOLA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
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or synthetic.

However, when he offers an analysis of

their .functioning, i.e. meaning, he discovers that they
are rather the frame through which,

or

the bedrock upon

which empirical propositiona have t.heir meaning.

Fui-

therm.ore, they cannot be considered analytic.
That "framework propositions" are not analytic ob-

serve the following.

What is the relationship between

someone's engaging in doubting behavior and his being
in doubt?

Obviously the tie between the two is not a

strictly logical one.

It is not a. matter of entailment.

It is perfectly conceivable, in almost any given case,

that the statement of' a :rramework proposition be true
while its related empirical proposition is false.
The characterization of the sort of propositions
which Wittgenstein metaphorically calls fluid or those
within the framework of a picture will be given first.
In analyzing one of the functions of this concept a

partial description of i'ta grammar will be presented.
One final point before proceding to our explication.
In developing - as an introduction to Wittgenstein's

grammatical descriptions - his concepts of "grammar,"
"rule," "game,• and

"cri~eria"

- it was mentioned that

though he does not use the concept "criterion" there is
overwhelming textual support that something like the
tool .. criteria" is used in .QB Cert:a!zltI•

It will now be
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shown that Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept "proposition" is an extension of his wierstanding of ttoriterion".

Take an expression which has been u.<3ed on numerous

previous occasions in this essay: .. that is a cedar tree"
(pointing to a tree).

What was happening in the linguistic

situation where the speaker uttered these words?

As we

have seen that utterance was one that could be tested, i.f
the situation required it.

If speaker

B was not

satisf~ed

that the tree pointed to was a cedar tree, speaker A would
have to show why the tree could be called a cedar tree.
?here was, then, the possibility that this utterance could
be tested.

Therefore if one were to ask what sort of thing

an "empirical proposition" is, the answer would follow
that it is an utterance which

i~

testable.

More formally

••empirical proposition", in this context, is "an utterance
which is testablen.(C-109)
It was stated that "empirical propositions are test-

able".

L~

order to extend our explication, it now should

be asked what do tests do?

Wittgenstein mentions a va-

riety of descriptions which characterize utterances which

are testable.

Most importantly they can bes (1) "correct

or mistaken .. , (2) "true qr false .. , (.3) "evidence can be

offered for or against them", (4) "supported or denied by
groWlds", and (5) "justi.fied in some way".

J6
If from the number of remarks made about what we shall

call "bedrock propositions" or ".framework propositions" one
could determine their interest .for Wittgenstein, then it
could be stated

tha~

_±rical propositions.

it far outweighs his concern for emIndeed empirical propositions are

mentioned only in relation to his more extensive discussion

of "framework propositions...

But this would be misleading,

for as we shall see empirical propositions can only be
understood in light o.f his clarification o.f other types
of propositions used in our talk about the world.

"Framework" or "bedrock propositions" a.re, to say the
least, norms, methodical principles, or rules for determining the correctness of something.

which they determine?
different things.

wb.at is this something

They are rules for a variety of

As we have seen they are used to decide

whether a person knows something, whether he believes something, whether a person is making a mistake, whether "x"

is a cedar tree, whether "y" is a police armoured personnel
carrier, etc.

Here we are not determining the way the

world is, but rather that one calls that particular object
a cedar tree.

The utterances for which there are framework propositions or statements, are ones which the speaker has a way

of showing to be true, justified, correct or grounded.

All

utterances of this sort have bedrock propositions governing
their use.
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In that "proposit1onstt are human norms, i.e. methodo-

logical principles, framework propositions are always propo•itions of some person or group of persons.

As with

Wittgenstein's earlier notion of criterion, this is an
important point, because one must not confuse bedrock
propositions with necessary and sufficient conditions.
It is absurd to hold that the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a cedar tree growing are different from
one person to another.

Necessary and sufficient conditions

are something in the world; they are not a matter which
is subject to linguistic determination.

With the case

of bedrock propositions the case is different.

There

may be a divergence from. person to person.
Bedrock propositions are abbitrary, 1n the sense
that there need be no justitication for bedrock propositions being what they are.

To use the picture metaphor

for a moment, Wittgenstein writes ff! did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness;
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.
Nos it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true or false".(C-94)

There is no need to

justify t.he truth of bedrock propositions for they are what
'

we use 1n detennining what, is true and what is false, i.e.
empirical propositions.

To ask whether they are true or

false is a question which soon loses its force.

3a

"Bedrock propositions" are internalized in linguistic
practice.

People who are engaged in this activity m.ay be

quite unable to say what they are.

Wittgenstein writes:

"the propositions describing this world-picture might be

part of a kind of mythology, and their role is like t.hat
of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely
practically, without learning any explicit rules".(C-95)
These bedrock propositions are generally rough and
imprecise.

rheir acknowledged use in normal circumstances,

rather than their precision is what makes them useful.{C-373)
Then again their

lac~

of exactitude is only a lack from

the perspective of a formalized system such as formal
logic.

From the standpoint of human communication they

are as precise as they need to be.

The roughness of

bedrock propositions can be exemplified in two ways.
First, the framework for "'x' is a cedar tree" determines
the evidence that shows "'x' is a cedar tree" is a true
or false proposition; and to say whether some set of circumstances are of this sort or not requires discrimination
that is not determined by the bedrock propositions and is
only given in practice.(C-1)9)

Second, the roughness of

bedrock propositions shows itself in one*s inability to
say exactly what bedrock propositions are for simple utterances like

0

making a mistake". (C-28)
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Bedrock propositions presuppose circumstances of

application.

This feature is apparent in cases where

there are many different bedrock propositions for a
linguistic utterance.

The vast majority of empirical

propositions have several complementary bedrock propositions. (C-27)

Moreover, there may be fluctuations be-

tween bedrock propositions for linguistic expressions
and empirical propositions which serve as "evidence"
for, the utterance.

The same propositions may get trea-

ted at one time as something to test by experience and

as a. rule for testing.

Wittgenstein writes, "It is

clear that our empirical propositions do not all have
t.he same status, since one can lay down such a. proposition and turn it .from an empirical proposition into a
norm of deseription".(C-167)

This is not to say that

all we have are empirical propositions.(C-423)

There

is not sharp boundary between t.he two. but the lack of
sharpness 1§ that of boundary between rule a.nd empirical

propositions.(C-J09t31S and 319}
This fluctuation between bedrock and empirical proposi tions is premised on the fact of the contextual character of bedrock

propositi~ns.

A linguistic situation has

a certain purpose and certain presuppositions and bedrock
propositions are among these presuppositions.

But not

all linguistic situations have t.he same purpose or presuppositions..

So what may

oe

taken as grammatical,. i.e.
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bedrock proposition in one situation could in another be
an empirical proposition.
lt'inaJ.ly, we can pose the difficult question whether

there aan be a conflict between different bedrock propositions.

In one sense, no, there could not be a con.flict.

If our bedrock propositions ceased to coincide, the propo-

sition to which they are related would dissolve in that
the expression would have no clear use.

In light of

this fact it is very difficult to see what sense there

would be in continuing to give the designation "bedrock
proposition° to those phenomena which have been coWlted
as bedrock propositions.

If there were no bedrock propo-

sitions, ther$ could be no conflict between them.

That

this is the case can be better realized when it is re-

called that bedrock propositions are human products with
regular uses, and their application presupposes oircumstances which frequently obtain, and where these circumstances do not obtain our propositions do not apply and

thus lose their sense.
It has been shown that within the language game it

is impossible to have a conflict over bedrock propositions.
The quest.ion now ean be

~ked

whether something i"rom out;-

side a part.icu.la.r language game can cause a conflict in
bedrock propositions.

\ihat will now b• shown is that there

is a possible conflict between two linguistic systems.
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Wittgenstein poses the question whether it is "wrong"
to guide one's actions according
sics.

to

propositions of phy-

Is one to say that one has no "good grounds 0 for

the propositions of physics?

Wittgenstein remarks, "Isn't

precisely this what we call a •good ground'".(C-608)
His point is that in our culture having "good grounds"

for something being the case is having propositions which
are articulated by the science of physics.

'l'o ask whether

the grounds offered by physics are "good grounds" would

be pointless.

*'Good grounds" are grounds which are for-

mulated by physics.

We first accept and acknowledge this

for we have been initiated in a culture which is unified
by science and education.

What would happen if one were to meet a people who
did not accept this as a telling reason?
physics they would consult an oracle.
accept as having "good grounds".

Instead of

This is what they

The question whet.her

these grounds are "good grounds" would be as pointless
for them as the question whether the grounds of physics
are good grounds for us.

Now i f one were to confront a person from this other
culture with the asserti<>n ..the sun is a large gaseous

mass•, he might retort that "the sun is a hole in the
sky•.

What one has here is a conflict over what it means

"to be the sun".

If our disputants were to offer their.
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groWlds for their concepts of the sun - "A large gaseous
mass" or "a hole in the sky" - neither would accept the
other's grounds as being "good grounds".
If one called the other "wrong" Wittgenstein writes,

"Aren't we using our language-game as a base t'rom which
to combat theirs".(C-609)

He also writes, .. I said I

would 'combat• the other man, - but wouldn't I give him
reasong?

Certainly; but how far do they go?

At the end

of reasons comes persµ1sion (think what happens when missionaries converted natives). "(C-612)

We have now brought to a conclusion our explication

ot .Qn Cer!faintx with its view towards the positive characterization which Wittgenstein offers of the structure of
factual discourse.

First presented was Wittgenstein's

formulation of the "grammar" and "criteria" for talk about
the world.

With these philosophical. tools at hand, we

followed Wittgenstein in offering the criteria for a set

of epistemic concepts.

The linguistic presuppositions

of these concepts were disclosed in bringing their meaning
to 'the fore.

We now turn to Wittgenstein's description

of the limits of this structure, 1n relationship to the
'

status of propositions about the existence of the physical

world.

Ci-1AP1'ZR TWO
WITTGENSTEIN'S

CRirIQlh~

OF .t400RE'S RZJECTION

OF THE SCEPTICAL DOU3T3 AS TO THE
EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
l'hough this chapter will off er a further explication
of Wittgenstein's analysis of the epistemic concepts given
grammatical descriptions in the previous chapter, our focus will no longer be on the normal circU!'llstances of their
use.

We will not precede in a further delineation of the

grammar of these concepts by way of an analysis of their
criteria which is the linguistic presUflposition of these

normal circumstances.

Rather, our analysis will explicate

his grammatical descriptions through his observations of
the abnormal occasions of their use.

The value of these

observations are that through them the limits of the
meaning of these concepts will be given.

'rhis will also

be a description of the grammar of these epistemic conoepts

but now

by

observing situations where there are no criteria

for their use.
What sort of abnormal circumstances does Wittgenstein

primarily concern himself with?

The examples given, in

On Certainty, are those in which G. E. Moore rejects the

sceptic's arguments against certainty as regards the existence of the physical world.

In offering instances of

abnormal situations, Wittgenstein will offer a description
of the "philosophical use" of epistemic concept.

4.3
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Wittgenstein offers no clear indication, in his
scattered remarks on Moore, to which article in particular he is at any given time referring.

The author has

taken the liberty, in making this explication as clear
and as true a.s possible to Wittgenstein's analysis, of
dividing Wittgenstein's remarks into two broad categories.
First to be taken up is his criticism of "A Defense of
Gommon Sense"which seems to revolve around Moore's use
of the expression "I know that ••• ".

Following this will

be an explication of his criticism of "Proof of the
External World", which seams to deal with t..1le sort of
"proposition" Moore attempts to prove, the sort of "proof"
he offers when he states "I know that ..... , and the "doubt"
which this proof is to overcome.
What Wittgenst.ein shows is that Moore takes the concepts "to know", "proof", "proposition", and ttto doubt"
out of their normal application in common discourse, and
puts them to a specifically philosophical use.

·l'his use

of these concepts transcends the limits of factual dis-

course in attempting to say what

cannot be said.

This production of factual nonsense is a consequence

of Moore's attempting to offer a proof for the existence
of the external world which he takes to be an epistemological difficulty.

Wittgenstein takes this

apis~em.ological
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difficulty as a

probl~n

of epistemic concepts.

to be dealt with by an analysis
For Wittgenstein this epistemolo-

gical difficulty can only be resolved by a semantic
analysis. (C-3)

We leave to chapter three our final clarification
of Wittgenstein's reflections on certainty as regards
the existence of the physical. world.

In explicating his

remarks on the structure of £actual discourse, in light
of the limits of i'ts meaningfulness, we will offer his

views on the status of propositions about the existence
of the physical world.

3ECTION ONE
The most pervasive criticism made by Wittgenstein
on Moore's article

0

A De£ense of Common Sense•• is con-

tained in the following aphorism. 6

He writes:

••• Now, can one enumerate what one knows
(like Moore)? Straight off like that, I
believe not. -For otherwise the expression
"I Know" gets misused. And through the
misuse a queer and extremely important
mental state seems to be revealed.(C-6)
In chapter one we had shown the specific use that is

made with the expression "I know that ••• ••.

We had shown

that this expression is commonly used in circumstances
where there is some possibility of a dispute about the
proposition asserted.

6a.E. Moore, ..A Defense of Common Sense, .. in PhilosoJhi-

g§l: Papers, (New Yorks Collier Books Edition, 1962), pp.2-59.
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We had also offered Wittgenstein's positive characterization of the concept ttto know".

With the clari.fication

of the criteria oi' "I know that ..... , we gained a partial
description of the grammar of "to know".

In summarizing

the results of that analysis, it was stated that .. I know
that ••• ", in comm.on linguistic contexts, is being able,
if requested, to state one's grounds for the statement, to

be in a position to make the statement, to state the truth

of the statement, and to believe the statement.

Further-

more, it was shown that "I know that ••• ", in context

J,

means an unwillingness to have one's grounds for the
statemei1t, one's position for the statement, the truth
of the statement, and the belief in the statement, tested.
Though in the other situation there was an implied willingness to entertain theppossibility of the statement being
mistaken.
Moore, to the contrary, does not use the expression
in either of the above manners.

He state.st "I know with

certainty that there exists at present a human body, which
is my body, this body was born at a certain time in the
past, and has existed continuously ever since", etc.
utters this in

aircumst~ces

He

where there is no one ques-

tioning him as to the truth of these assertions.
must ask, How does this expression get misused?

Now we
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Imagine the situation where Moore was questionsd on
how long he has known such things as he has asserted.
would

He

no doubt suggest that he has known them since the

time he could

think about them.

Here it is easy to be

misled into conceiving of "knowing" as similar to "thinking••

in that they are both taken as mental states.
So even when he hadn•t ut't#ered these assertions, say,
a month before he wrote his essay, there was a "placeff

where these assertions could be found.
be the "knowing process••.

This "place" would

His utterances would be the

external mani.f estation of the known thing which is somehow
in his mind.

When he does utter these assertions, their

truth is assured by the f'aet that they ref er, are the
manifesta.tion of, this mental state.

This mental state

is the ground for his utterances because they merely report
a mental occurrence.

Here the picture is complete.

Moore

has been deceived into conceiving "I know that ••• " as

similar to "I am thinking" is similar to "I am certain",

n1 am sure", in that it is a description of how one holds

an assertion.

But "I

know that ••• ••, as we have seen,

does not function that way.
We have presented, in the above imaginary situation,
the picture, i.e. theory, of what knowing is taken to be

by G. E. Moore.

This picture is a result of his misuse of
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of the concept "to know".
question.

But we do not have Moore here to

So we will, following Wittgenstein, approach and

criticize Moore•s picture of knowing in an indirect manner.
Even i f we had Moore here to criticize, it is doubtful
whether Wittgenstein, and this analysis in following him,
could confront and criticize Moore's concept of knowing in
a direct way.

To the question "What is knowing?", we have

imaginatively elicited an answer from Moore.
stein rejected this and stated

0

If Wittgen-

No, knowing is ••• ", then

he would fall wider the same illusion which captivates
Moore.

Wittgenstein would be offering just another con-

ception of what k."l.owing is.

He would be replacing one pic-

ture with another, one theory with another.
However, the uniqueness of Wittgenstein's method lies
in the fact that he does not off er any philosophical theories.

Yet his method is not merely an empirical observation

of linguistic facts which would be utilized in anthropological linguistics.

Rather, these ordinary linguistic facts

are used to dissolve philosophical pictures and the paradoxes which arise from them.
that Wittgenstein

ta...~es

l'here are at least two approaches

in his criticism of Moore's concep-

tion of knowing.
No better introduction can be given to Wit'tgenstein's
first criticism than when he writes:
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••• Moore's view really comes down to this:
the concept 'know' is analagous to the concept.s 'believe', 'surmise•, 'doubt•, 'be
convinced' in that the statement 'I know .... '
can't be a mistake and if that 1! so, then
there ean be an in.ference form such an
utterance to the truth of an assertion.
And here the form 'I thought I knew' is
being overlooked.(C-21)

For Moore the expression "I mow that ••• " is conceived
as guaranteeing the truth of the assertion.

It functions

tor him as a ground upon which the truth of the proposition
depends.

has.

This ground is something which l.iloore personally

It is something that he has an inner sense about.

The expression "I know that ••• " is then merely a report

on this inner sense.
This would be a misunderstanding of the use of the

concept "to know".

Moore regards this expression as

little subject to doubt as •I am convinced".(c-17a)

One

doesn't normally doubt that a person is convinced of what
he knows.

It may be suggested that he ought not be so

sure, but his •state of conviction.. is not doubted.

But,

"I know that ••• " is under normal linguistic situations
subject to doubt.

One of the linguistic presuppositions

of the concept •to known is that one can be •1n doubt"
about the proposition

as~erted.

In attempting to use the

concept "to know" as analogous to "to be convinced", Moore
wants this concept to be used in a way that it means

"a referral to a mental state that can not be doubted".
Bu.t

he has not established this new criterion.

50

In that Moore considers the utterance "I know that ••• "
as little subject to doubt as "I am convinced", he has
overlooked the expression °I thought I knew". (C-12)

That

this expression is used in normal discourse reveals the

fact that the language-game of knowing is one wherein there
is the possibility of doubting a proposition, and mistakenly
holding a proposition to be a statement of what is the ease.
This has been shown in Wittgenstein's characterization of
the concept "to know".

Within the language-game of knowing, the expression
"I know that ••• n is used just in those circurnstances where
the speaker recognizes that there is opposition to his
statement.

Furthermore, it was shown that part of the cri-

teria for the use of this expression is that there is the
possibility of offering growids, or evidence for the truth
of the assertion.

If it is possible to show that the

statement is correct by offering grounds, then there is the

possibility of showing the doubtful character of the statement by offering grounds which show that it is false.

This

is what Moore failed to see •
.t'-.ioore wants the concept nto know" to function in a way
similar to .,to be convinced", in that one could not be mistaken about what one knows.

He holds, in effect, that "I

know that ••• " means "can not be false".
not established this new criteria.

However, Moore has
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l'he most that can be drawn from the use of the
expression "I know that ••• " is that "he believes what he
knows".(C-106)

As Wittgenstein has

sho~n,

part of the

linguistic presupposition of the expression '"I
is "I believe tha.t ••• tt.

~"'low

that ••• ''

Therefore, from the fact that

Moore "believes what he knows" to the truth of the proposition he asserts is the gap of having to offer his grounds,
his evidence, and his position for the truth of the assextion.
The second criticism which Wittgenstein levels against

Moore's use of the expression "I know that ••• " will now be
explicated.

We have seen that part of the meaning of the

concept "to know" is that "one is in a position"' to otfer
growids or evidence tor the truth of a proposition.

But

a remarkable feature of Moore's use of the expression is
that he relates propositions which everyone would be in
a position to know.(C-100)

One of'!'ers "one's position .. for knowing in those cixcumstances where there is some doubt raised as to whether
one could be in a position to know the assertion uttered.
But what sense does this make, i f everyone is in a position

to know that assertion?

To avoid this contradiction, Moore

must conceive of the concept "to know" as lacking, as one

or

its linguistic presuppositions, the possibility of being

or not being '*in a position" to know.
has not been justified by Moore.

But this new criteria
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In summation, Moore t2-kes "I know that ..... as a

revelation of an important mental state which guarantees
the truth of the assertion made.
as being beyond doubt.

This assertion is taken

That it is beyond doubt is also

gro\J.nded 1n the mental state of lmowi.."l.g.

These truths

are euch that they are known by everyone.

Finally• in

that knowing iG a mental process and in that these truths
are kno,,.,n to everyone, then anyone can readily recite
those truths which are shared 'oy all.

This is the phi-

losophical use of the concept "to know".
However, the common meaning of "I know that ••• " is
such that it is not a reference to an inner state which

guarantees the truthfulness of the assertion.

It does

not off er a guarantee that the assertion is beyond doubt,
and it it did, it would not do so by a referral to an
inner state.

"I know that ••• " is used to indicate that

one is in a position to know, and this would be supei-

tluous if everyone was in a position to offer grounds
for the assertion.

FinallYt this expression is not used

in circumstances where one recites a set of propositions
bald to be true.
Before turning to Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore's
"Proof for the Existence of the External World", we should
note what positive significance, i.f any, Wittgenstein found

in Moore's "A Defense of Common Sense".

It should be noted
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that what follows will only take on its full significance
when we turn in chapt..er three to Wittgenstein's positive
clarification of certainty as regards the existanee of
physical objects, though we will have cause to note again

in this chapter.
Vlittgenstein writes t..."1.at when Moore states such
things about the world, he is really enumerating a lot

of empirical propositions which we affirm without any
special testing.

In other words these propositions have

a peculiarly logical role in the system of our empirical
propositions.{C-lJ6)
As we have seen, Moore's telling us that he knows

such and such propositions can't satisfy the criteria
for calling these propositions true, and that he knows
them to be true.

Rather, it oan only be said that 1'he

believes that he knows".

For Wittgenstein, Moore's ass'lll-

anoes that he knows them is not

or

philosophical interest.

However, tlle propositions are very interesting.

Not be-

eaase anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them,
but because these propositions all have a similar role in
the syst.em of our empirical judgments.(C-lJ7)
For example, we do not arrive at them a.s a result of
'

investigation.

There are biological investigations into

the structure and relationship of various parts of the
animal bodies, but not

in~o

whether animal bodies do exist
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or have a"Cisted a hundred years ago.

Of course many of

us have in.formation a.bout this matter.
information be wrong'?

"Nonsense", one would say, "how

eould all these people be wrong!"
ment?

3ut couldn't

But is that an argu-

Rather, isn't this simply a rejection of an idea?

Would not this also be a determination of a concept?

For

if one speaks of a possible mistake here, does not this
change the role of ••mistake" and "correctness•• in langu.aga? (C-lJS)

So though Wittgenstein takes objection to Moorets use
of the concept «to know" in relation to the proposition he
enumerates in "A Defense of Common Sense• - and one can

extend this

~o

the ones he enumerates in the "Proof of the

External World" - he does see value in Moore's analysis.
M'.oore has brought to light a group of role-related propo-

sitions.

These are empirical propositions, yet they are

not tested by any special investigation.

They are propo-

sitions which people do not go about being mistaken about.
Tha~

one is not "mistaken" about them is a result of their

place in our language.
SECTION TWO

It is now time to give Moore's famous proof for the
existence of the External. world.

instance, that two hands exist.

*'I can :prove now, for
How?

By

holding up my
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two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with
the right hand, "Here is one hand," and adding, as I make

a oertain gesture with the le.ft, "and here is another.*'
And if 1 by doing th.is, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can
also do it ••• 0 .7

In taking up Witt,genstein•s objections to Moore's
proof for the existence of the external world we will
,

concentrate on the following point~!& (l) the use of the
concept "proof" in 14oore's essay, (2) the "doubt" which
1s the occasion for of:fering the proo.f, and (J) the sort
1

o.f "propoaitiontt which is proved.
Turning to the £1rst, Wit.tgenstein seems to accept

that a valid proof should have the

charaot~iatics

are mentioned by Moore in his article.

whieh

These are (l) the

premises differ from th• conolaaion, (2) one knows the
premises to be t.rue, and (j) ·t;he conclusion logioally

follows from the premises.

But Wittgenstein will argue

that Moore•s proof 1a no proof at all, because it fails
to meet the above eri't«r1t\ for calling an ut.te:rance a

?a.

E. Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense,• in Ph~oso

Pbic~ ~apers, (New York# Collier Books Edition, 19t>!!~
pp •. -;~.
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We have already given Wittgenstein •s analysis of the
concept "to know" and have sho'lrm where Moore transcended

its liiuits.

Moore misuses this concept in uttering the

expressions he utters.

So no further comments on this

point will be made here.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein offers

no discussion of the third characteristic by way of criticism of Moore.
We will take up the first criterion for calling something a proof 1 i.e. the premises differ from the conclusion.

Here we wa.'tt to focus on how the premises "differ" from

the conclusion.
Wittgenstein shows that in point of linguistic fact
they do not ''differ" in this essential aspect; they do not
differ in the sense needed in the statement of the first
criterion of a "proof 1' .

The

0

Here is one hand n and "Here

is another" do not differ, in an essential way, from the
conclusion "There is an external world" is seen in the
.fact that premises are not more certain than the conclusion.

That Uiere is an external world, i.e., physical objects, is in normal circumstances, as certain as anything
that could be produced as evidence for it.

This ia why

one is not in a position, to take the sight of one's hands

as evidence tor it.(C-2.50)

But, i t one cannot offer any

evidence for or against the conclusion, the evidence or
premises which are offered do not differ from the conclusion,
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in the sense that the premises are said to "support" or

"justify.. the conclusion.

If they do not differ in this

sense, then they do not "differ" 1n the way needed in the
characterization of the first criterion.
In conclusion, if one cannot say "he knows the pre-

mises to be true", and the premises do not "differ" from
the conclusion, then one has not offered what is normally
called a "proof••.

Moore has offered a proof where neither

of the above points obtain.

In effect, Moore has offered

a proof which is no "proof" at all.

He has attempted to

transcend the common criteria of "proof" in attempting to
offer a uniquely philosophical proof.
Now for the analysis of Wittgenstein's second objection.

In taking up the doubt as to the existence of the

external world, there will be a final clarification of
our analysis of the concept "to doubt" which was t>egun
in the first chapter of this essay.
Moore's

0

It will be shown that

philosophical proof .. was an attempt to answer a

nphilosophical doubt".
Wittgenstein will argue that such a doubt is an expression of what cannot be expressed in this manner.

The

expression of this sort of doubt will be the utterance of
factual nonsense.

"I doubt the existence of the external

world" will be a non-significant utterance within this
context.

In the second section of chapter one we had distin-

guished three di££erent sorts of doubt.

They are: (l) doubts

that are reasonable, (2) doubts that are superfluous, and
(J) doubts t.hat are absurd.

The nonsensicalness of the

third sort of doubt was shoi.·m by the fact, t.t'lat speakers

A, B, and C would not say that this was the doubt
reasonable man.

o:f

a

But rather they are "irrational ramblings".

This type of doubt was really not a doubt at all, but evi-

dence for the insanity o.f speaker D.
!'iow .for an extension of Wi ttgenatein • s analysis or

this sort of doubt, which is really no doubt at all.

Here

we will want to distinguish this from a "philosophical
doubt 0 1 and also to distinguish both of these from what we
could call "ordinary or scientific doubt" or doubting behavior. (C-259)

l'ake l,loore's statement "Here is one hand•1 , and "here

is another 0

•

Moore states that he knows these two state-

ments ara t.ru.e.

We had observed that the criterion tor

such a statement is that there is a doubt t;o be removed, a.
method by which it could be rem.oved.

This method is car-

ried out by giving grounds, offering one's position for
holding, etc.
How the doubts which are raised and the proof which
Moore otf ers against them, do not have the criteria of
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"doubting" described above.

Consider the circumstances

in which Moore would have spoken correctly if he had said,

•r know that here is a hand." He and his audience, at, the
British Academy, had his hand in full iriew.

Ir his hand

had bffn concealed in a box it is unlikely that he would
have pointed at the box and said to his audience "I know
that there is a hand ...

I.£ rumor had it that Moore recently

lost, his arm and acquired an artif'icia.l one, he would have
probably used his head as an example.

The point is that

Moore would have wanted the circumstances to be such that
there was no question or doubt about his hand. ( 0-4S3)

So it is interMting that Moo:-e of£ers his proof'
where there is no question or doubt as to the existence
0£ his hand, and we could also a.aume that there was no

doubt as to the existence o£ the external world.

By way

ot retort, it could be stated that there was a "philosophical doubt" as to whether his hand existed.
quite true.

This is

But Wittgenstein's point now would be that

one has a "philosophical doubt" 1n circumstances wher•

there is not any doubt as to the truth of t.he statement

"I know that is my hand".
If his hand was in a box or there was the chance that
'

Moore had an art1.£icial hand, then this example would not
be used.

Moore and h.is opponent would want to use an

ex.ample for his *'philosophical doubt" where there was no
"doubtn as to whether it was his hand or not.

The use of
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an objeot a.s an example for expressing philosophical arguments in support of the questioning or doubt as to the
existence 0£ that object only works when there is no ordinary doubts like the ones we have cited in our illustration

of the use of the concept "to doubt."

It rnuat be the ca.CJe

that there is no doubt bef'ore there is a "philosophical
doubt" as to whether one is certain that that's l'loore's
hand.
But it

could

· ·. be argued that one could be doubting

the existence of Moore's hand in the sense that the doubter
may merely be dreaming about Moore and his hand.

Indeed

this is a poweri'u.l argument against certainty in regard
to

objects perceptually given.

':'~1is

argument is used by

Descartes in showing that all perceptual judgments are
never certain for one may be dreaming.

Imagine that we

were watching D.escartes when he wrote down this argument.

Suppose t.hat he was facing his fireplaoe, as he developed
his argument against certainty as regards the existence
of physical objects.

Now we see him get up .from his desk,

move over to the fireplace and set on new logs.

sets a tea pot to boil.

Then he

It would seem a mis-description

to say that Descartes was in "doubt" as to wheth.er there
was a fire, or that he was only dreaming.

He doesn't

behave as one would, i.f he was doubting 'the existence 0£
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the physical world.

It would be a misuse of the concept

"to doubt" to call the above doubting.
displays none

o:f

For Descartes

the phenomena by which we could say that

he was doubting.
Now consider the situation where a man is seated in
I

a room with his back to the .fireplace with a closed screen.
On different occasions during the day the fire has gone

out, and so now he

s~ops

writing to peer over the screen.

Here would be normal circumstances for saying that. he
was in "doubt" a.bout whether there was a .fire or not.
Wittgenstein's point is that where there is a doubt
about the exist.ence or sa.y a fire, then no nphilosophical

doubt" would arise.

Only i f the fire was happily burning

away could one then pose the philosophical question whether

there was or wasn't a .fire.
Consider the following case.

A man awakes from a

nap and observes a fire in his fire place.

He is perplexed

because he hadn't started the fire before he went to bed.
He shakes his head in order to clear it, stares intently
at the fire, and says
.fire.••
t,o

0

Perhaps I'm dreaming that there is

With extended. hands .he moves t.owards the fireplace

feel the heat of the fire.

"Y~a,

out of the room and calls his wife.

it is hot."

He rwi.s

When 'they both return

to his room, he states "Is this a real firet or am I dreaming?"
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This man is in doubt as to whether he is dreaming or
awake.

His utterence as to doubts about being awake is

part of his doubt,ing behavior.

When a man is having a

"philosophical doubt" about whether he is dreaming or is
awake he does not perform these actions.

If our philoso-

pher did perform these actions, we would no longer say
that he had a "philosophical doubt."

Behavior which

would count as criteria tor saying he was in "doubt" as

to whether he was awake would count against saying that
he was feeling a "philosophical doubt".
Let us compare a doubt which Moore attempts to meet
with philosophical proof and the ordinary sense of the
concept "doubt" offered above.

One of the features of

the above illustration was that something extraordinary
had oecured.

Another was anxiety over whether that was

a real fire or just a dream.

Now Moore in the British

Academy was not trying to meet a doubt about the existence
of the external. world which had these characteristics.
Indeed Moore would have sent such a questioner off to a
doctor, rat.her then try to meet his objections himse1f.
One would not even ca.ll them "objections".

Rather they

are taken to be symptoms, of what is called an "emotional
problem."
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So to have a "philosophical doubt" as to whether the
external world exists does not imply that one is in "doubt 0
as to whether the physical world exists.
sophical doubt" a

0

To call a "philo-

doubt 0 would be to extend the concept

beyond the criteria for its application.

In such an ex-

tension 2·1oore has uttered factual nonsense.

One cannot

understand the meaning of the concept ••to doubt" for he
has not offered any new criteria for its use.
Now for the final set of objections which Wittgenstein

makes against Moore's proof.

The topic has alteattr been

broached in the explication of Wittgenstein's criticism of
Moore's use of the concept "to know" in Moore's, "A Defense
of Common Sense".

There it was developed that Moore's

article had the positive signi.ficance of bringing to light
a group of propositions which had a similar role in the
logic of our language.

A further clarif'ication of this

can now be given.
iJioore thought that in offering a proof for the justi-

fication of the statement

0

There are external objects••,

that this statement and others like it were empirical propositions.

Wittgenstein will show that in point of linguis-

tic fact that 'they are not empirical propositions at all,
in that Moore attempts to prove this proposition - here
we are assuming, contrary to fact, that Moore did off er a
.. proof" to meet "doubts" raised - as one would prove an
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empirical propositions, he is producing nonsense.(C-35)
I'd t tgenstein writes :

••• "A is a physical object!' is a piece or
instruction which we give only to someone
who doesn't yet understand either what
"A" means, or what ''physical objects"
means. Thus it is instruction about the
use of words, and "physical object" is a
logical concept. (Like colour, quantity, ••• )
And that is why no such proposition as
"there are physical objects" can be formulated. Yet we encounter such unsuccessful shots at every turn.(c-36)

Here Witlgenstein begins his criticism with an analysis of the propositions which Moore attempts to prove.
Basically, his point is that the assertion "That tree
is a physical object" (pointing to a tree) is, from an
analysis o.f its functioning in our language, not an
assertion about the world.

Indeed to call it an assei-

tion would be a mis-description.

or

Rather the utterance

this expression is a verbal indication of the speaker's

intention to use these concepts in a certain way.

It is

then an expression of the speaker's decision to have the
concepts function in a particular way, i.e. to mean something particular by its utterance.
Wittgenstein's point then is that to assume that the
proposition "There are P,hysical objects" is asserting
something about the world is to assume that the truth of
this proposition can be obtained by showing one's grounds
or evidence.

Assertions can be tested.
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This is exactly what Moore attempts to do.

His proof

for the existence of the external world consists in off ering his evidence for the truth of this proposition.
grounds he presents are his two hands.

The

This is the test

by which he thought one could demonstrate the truth of the

''There is an external world."

proposition.

Imagine the following situation of a child talking
to its mother.

radio)?"

.a.

A. "Mother what is that (pointing to a
A. "What is a radio?"

"That is a Radio.••

B. "Well, a radio is a physical object.
radio waves which ••• "
B.

0

Over it we get

A. naut why is it a physical object? ..

Vell ••• it sits on the table, we can see it, etc."

A. "But why do you say that it is a physical object just
because it ••• "

a.

"Well we just call things like radioes

physical objects that's all ...

A. nsut why.••"

.a.

"t~ow

stop it, your asking silly questions."
Here is a common situation where one utters "A radio
is a physical object."

What is happening here?

ther explained to her child

tJ:1at

'the radio

was

The moa physical

object because it sat on the table, i.e. it doesn't appear

only to disappear.

But this is not a test or evidence !or the radio
being a physical object.

Rather, when the child asked

why do we call such things that sit around, things that
we can see, etc., physical object, the mother retorts that
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we just call ti.t.11em that.

To question why we use this

expression the way we do is a senseless question to the
mother.

This is just the way we use the expression.

This is its meaning.

The child must accept this, i t he

is to learn his way about.
It could be objected that this is a correct description of how we learn the meaning o:f "radio• and "physical
object".

But the meaning of the expression "Radio is a

physical object" is not necessarily co-extensive with the
way we wer$ taught to use it.

This doesn't seem to refute

a philosophical use of the expression of the proposition.

But what would this use be like?
Surely it's not the following.
don't know.

I get these feelings."

A. "That everything is inside me.

no outer."

A. "Well, I just
3. "What do you feel? ..

It's all inner.

B. "I don't quite Wlderstand."

know that there is a physical world.

There•s

A. "Well, I

But everything looks

queer and ••• "
Here we have a situation where "I know that there is
a physical world" makes sense.

3peak.er A, would not be

aided by the arguments offered by a realist.
we call him an idealist.
blems".

Nor would

Rather he has ''emotional pro-

The docrtor wou.ld not show his patient one hand

and then the other, in an attempt to show him the correctness of the statement.

The utterance of that proposition
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is taken as a symptom of a deeper problem to be dealt
with.

It is an expression of a conviction which is

doubted.

We may ask again, what meaning can one give

to the uniq·u.ely philosophical use of .,there are physical
objects".

At this point no new criteria has been of.fared.

In ordinary situations "Object A is a physical object"

is a piece of instruction on the use of words.

.,There

are physical objects" is an expression of a commitment
to a certain set of convictions which are doubted.

In

neither case is it part of the criteria for these propositions to offer grounds or evidence for their truth.

Wittgenstein has disclosed the meaninglessness of a
proof for the existance of the external world and doubts
which call .forth such a proof.

It has been shown that

both Moore and the sceptic have covertly withdrawn the
ordinary criteria for the use of the concepts "to know",

"proof", "to doubt••, and "proposition" without replacing
these criteria with new, extraordinary criteria which could

offer a new meaning on these concepts in their new contexts.
The sceptic has generated the illusion o.f disclosing an
unanswerable question.

Moore confirn:ls this illusion with

an attempted solution to this unanswerable question.
all they have in .fact done is to discover a context in

3ut

6S
which these expressions become strictly meaningless while
retaining a plausible surf ace appearance of meaningfulness.
~';e

have now completed our examination of .Qn

focusing on

Wittgenstei..~'s

Certain~I

observation on abnormal occa-

sions for the use of certain pronainent epit.emic concepts.
Through an explication of his analysis of the "philosophical use 1' of these concepts we have partially sketched the
limits of factual discourse.

CHAP'fER. THREE

THE FUNCTION OF FRAMEWORK PROPOSITIONS IN
FACTUAL

DI3COUR3E

In chapter two we mentioned what Wittgenstein regarded

as significant 1n Moore's essay "A Defense of Common Sense".
i4oore's article was valuable in that it hrought into view

a set of propositions which played similar roles in the logic of factual discourse.

We also had cause to note that

Moore attempted to prove a set of propositions which are

not subject to a proof.

This characteristic is contingent

on the fact that these propositions are not testable.
other words, they are not empirical propositions.

In

In

concluding this essay, chapter three will explicate Wittgenstein's analysis of the status of these propositions.
In undertaking this task, we will bring together

Wittgenstein's logical descriptions of the epistemic concepts resultant upon the disclosure of their limits as
offered in chapter two.

To be more precise, Wittgenstein

develops the thesis that there is a group of role related
propositions in which the use of the concept "to doubt"
normally carries no meaning.

Furthermore, "to be mis-

taken" is not part of the criteria of these propositions.
In that the linguistic presupposition of these propositions

"can •t be" related to ''to doubt" and "to be mistaken", one

does not normally use the expression "I know that ..... in
relation to their utterence.

These are propositions,

however, that have "to be certain" as one of their criteria.
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w~at

sort of propositions are these?

They are

propositions used 1n the way we have described as being
"bedrock" or ••framework" propositions.
sorts of propositions are ones liker

Among these

"I have lived on

the earth all my lii'e", "I am called R.M.", and "Object

A is a physical. object...
Before we procede to Wittgenstein•s analysis of
the above, first a review of his analysis of the concept
"proposition".

It was mentioned that propositions have

traditionally been divided into two sorts, analytic and
synthetic.

Wittgenstein in his grammatical descriptions

of the concept •proposition" reveals that this classifi-

cation ia unjustifiable in that it excludes a rule-related group of propositions.

We have called these propo-

sitions :framework or bedrock propositions.

As was shown

these propositions are neither analytic or synthetic.

Wittgenstein's analysis disclosed that "Framewort
propositions" arei

(1) "Norms of description, or me'tho-

dological principles tor determining whether som.eching
exists or not"; (2) "such as to determine of the meaning
of certain sort of propositionn; (.3) "such as to determin.e
the meaning of empirical propositions and all utterances
of this sortl; (4) "a matter of linguistic convention

rather then necessary and su.ff'icient conditions 11 1
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(5) ••arbitrary in that they need no justification for being

what they are"; (6) .. illterna.l.1zed in linguistic practice,
and persons engaged in this

aetivi~y

may be quite unable

to say what they are"; (7) •rough and imprecise"; (9) "Ones
that fluctuate;" and (10) •such that they are not in conflict
in the language-game, but can when one language-game con-

fronts another".

Here then is a partial description of

the concept "proposition••.
His Q.na.lysis also revealed that "empiriea.J. propositionstt
are: (l) "are utterances that can be tested"; {2) "are
utterances that can 'be correct or mistaken''; (3) "they
can be t.rue or false"; (4) ••they have gi"ounds for or
against them"; and {5) "They can be just.if ied".

This

completes the description of the concept "proposi'tion" as
given in .Qn Ceirtaint;y.
In passing, it should be noted that this analysis has

not included "mathematical proposit.ions".

Wittgenstein

makes only a few scattered remarks to propositions

or

this

Thus, the description of Wittgenstein's analysis

sort.

or

t,he concept "proposition" is incomplete.
No better introduction to that sort of proposition
which excludes as one of

i~s

linguistic presuppositions

the concept "to doubt" can be given then when Wittgenstein
writes:
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••• Can't an assertoric propositiont which
is capable of functioning as an hypothesis,
also be used as a foundation for researeh
and action? I.E. can't it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to
any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed
as a truism, never called in question,
perhaps not even formulated..(C-S7)
Here Wittgenstein draws attention to the fact that
there are a.ssertoric propositions, i.e., empirical propositions which do not function in language as empirical
propositions.

What particular characteristic of these

propositions leads him to suspect that they a.re not
assertions at all?
The answer is given in the above.

a.re not doubted.

These propositions

As we had seen in the analysis of the

expression "empirical proposition", it is part of their
criteria that they a.re t,he sort of utterance that can be
tested.

But "to test" means that there can be someone

"in doubt" as 'to the truth of 'the statement.
this point two examples will be given.

To illustrate

One f'rom the field

of scientific research and 'the other from non-scientific ••
discourse.

Wittgenstein wants to show, by this example and others
like it, that all inquiry is set so as to exempt certain
propositions from doubt.' These propositions may not even
be formulated.

The important point is that they lie

apart from the route traveled by inquiry. (C-,58)

The

first example will be Lavoisier and his chemical investigations. {C-167)
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Lavoisier makes experiments witJl certain substances
He concludes after long months or

in his laborat,ory.

research that this and that takes place when there is
burning.

He does not say that it might happen otherwise

another time.
Now Wittgenstein wants to say that Lavoisier has a'
definite world-picture, i.e. a system of
sitions.

He did not invent this.

that he draws up.

fra..~ework

propo- ·

It is not a hypothesis

Rather he has learned this a.a a child.

These framework propositions are the matter of course
foundation for his research and as such go unmentioned.
Now to make one of them explicit.

One of the pre-

suppositions of' these experiemMJ's as t.hat "A substance X
always reacts to subst.ance Y in the same way, given the

same circumstances."

What role does this presupposition

play in Lavoisier's scientific researchs?
Would it not be that this is part of the definition
0£ what is meant by "substance.••

It is part of the norm

of description of what is taken to be a ttsubstance."
Substances are taken to be those sorts of things which
when you have X and Y reacting under the same circumstances,
they will react in the same way as they did the week before.
Within this situation Lavoisier did not formulate, let
alone doubt, that a substance is that set 0£ phenomena that
always react. in the same way, under the same circumstances.
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It is something that he would have taken as a truisni.
What if someone approached him with a doubt as to whether
this was really a "substance."

Lavoisier would have dis-

missed him in rather a cursory way.
say nr couldn•t doubt that."
one kind of assertion.

He might jokingly

This utterance characterizes

If our questioner continued in

his doubts, Lavoisier might wonder if he was fluent in
the English language.(C-631)
the Bnglish language?

Does he really understand

For everyone knows that substances

are the sort of phenomena that react in the same way under
the same circumstances.
If our questioner continued in his doubts and grew
more f orce.ful, Lavoisier would not take him as a man who
doubts in the normal way.
at all.

Indeed, this is not a "doubt"

Lavoisier would seek aid, for this man is "Emo-

tionally maladjusted."
That "substance.. is taken as that particular set of

phenomena is not something that Lavoisier decided upon.
Rather it is something that he was taught as a child while

observing the world around him.

It is accepted by all

those who were brought up in his culture.

This is the

meaning of the concept and the majority of people in his
culture would not accept doubts about this.

Rather it is

the foundation of all scientific actions.{C-414)
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Now consider the following situation.
seated in his study reading.

through the door.
door."

liis

A man is

friend comes walking

J...s he does the other asks "shut the

The friend does what was asked.

One of the

presuppositions of this utterance is that door•s are
the sort of thing that react under a certain amount of
presure, have a degree of density, etc.
words a

0

It is in other

physical object".

It is in this situation impossible for either of

the two men ''to doubt" that the door is a "physical
object".

It one of them would have uttered "Yes, that

is a physical object" the other might have taken it as
a joke.
upon.

It is a truism that they both accept and act
As with Lavoisier's understanding of the concept

"substance", it is taken as part of the definition of
"door 0 that it is a physical object.

What if' someone.

a third friend, tried to induce a doubt about whether
that was a door or not?

The situation would be similar

to the one offered in the first example.
In both situations doubts were not found acceptable.
Doubts about whether X and Y are substances or whether a
door is a physical object are groundless.
speak about doubts at all.

One can not

Rat.her that X and Y are sub-

stances and the door is a physical object are grounds for
subsequent doubts.

Whether A is helium or not in the
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former case, and whether it is wise to shut the door (if
it was hot out) for the latter.

'rhat a mistake is logically impossible is the second
characteristic of this sort of proposition.

The grammar

of "framework propositions., are such as to exclude "making
a mistake."

For an eJCam.ple, recall

3itua~1on

9 in

chapter

There it was shown t}lat propositions like "I am R.M.",

one.

"I live in Chicago", etc., function in such a way that
normally they are not mistaken.

How was this shown?

In that situation speaker A refused to accept any

evidence to the effect that he was not R.M.

To give up

or entertain as mista.}(en bis name, A would have to question
a set of related propositions likes where he lives, how

old he is, what he does for a living, etc., and speaker A
would not allow this.

Al1 speaker A's past experience

spoke in favor of his being R.M. and nothing spoke against
it.

This would concluaivel.Y show that he is in fact R.M.
That these grounds are conclusive is premised on the

fact that people are brought up to accept many propositions
as unmistakeable, and the grounds which one has for them

are considered conclusive.

One does not doubt in normal

circwnstances tha't one couJ.d .. be mistaken" about these
things.
If one was mistaken a.bout where he put his keys this

is nothing unusual, but what would one say of a person who
was

mista~en

about his name?

Would one say that he made a
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"mistake" in the same sense as being mistaken about his
keys?

No, one just does not make mistakes about one's

name.
To clarify this, Wittgenstein observes that mistakes
not only have a. "cause", but they also have a "ground".

when someone makes a mistake it can in most circumstances
be fitted into what he knows.

If one is "mistaken" about

where he left his keys, he still knows he is in the right
house, he

~nows

that he has just come home from work, etc.

Here there is a mistake about one particular point in a
field of points.
However, the case of someone who made a "mistake"
about his identity is different.

Joe Jmith said he was

Jesus Christ and lived in Galilee.

He would be mistaken

about his whole field and not just one or a couple of
points within it.
called "insanity".

But this kind of mistake is usually
One would say that he was "temporarily

confused and disoriented" and this is not a "mistake".
In that the concepts "to doubt .. and "to be mistaken"

are not related to the criteria of "framework proposition", one could not conceive of their criteria as including the concept ••to know".

The reasons for this are

fairly obvious.
The concept "to know" is used in situations where
there is a recognition on the part of the speaker that his
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assertion might be subject to dispute.

The concept "to

know" is then used when one is using "empirical propositions".
As we had seen, the concept ••to know" means that

"one can, if requested, offer one's grounds or evidence
for, one's position for, show the possibility of the
truth of, and believe that p."

"Empirical propositions"

are propositions that can be 'true or false, can have
grounds for or against them, and can have evidence for
or against them.

'l'he concept .,to know" and

proposition" just hang together in this way.

0

emp1rical
Per Wittgen-

stein, to ask why their grammar hang together in thio way
is a futile question.

They just do.

With "framework propositions" the case is quite different.

As we have shown framework propositions are just

those propositions which are not "in doubt•• in a particular
linguistic situation.

Lavoisier did not even formulate

the proposition "A substance always reacts in the same
way, under the same circumstances".

This linguistic pre-

supposition he could not have been "in doubt" about.

But

neither would i't# be grammatically correct to say "I know
that substances are called things that react ••• " in this
situation.
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Recall that when Lavoisier was questioned about the
possibility of whether substance may not mean "something
that always reacts in the same way, under the same circumstances", he did not state that he knew such.
he dismissed the question.

Rather.

A doubt about the truth of

this proposition was "groundless" in this situation.
If "grounds" or "evidence" are lacking one can not

speak of knowing.

It is part of the criteria of "to

know" that one can off er "grounds" for or against the
truth of a statement.
One should not be misled into thinking that one
could not say "! know that a substance is......

Here

one may be giving a report on the discovery of a new material that did not react as the others had.

As an empi-

rical matter, one would have to offer one's grounds,
evidence, etc., for such a statement.

.. I know that ••• " is correctly used.

The expression
'rhere may be a

fluctuation between empirical propositions and framework
propositions.
That there is a fluctuation is nothing unusual once
the contextualized character of bedrock propositions is

understood.

A linguistic situation has certain purposes

and certain presuppositions and bedrock propositions are
among these presuppositions.
grammatical propositions.

These may be explained in

But not all linguistic situa-

tions have the same purposes or presuppositions.

So what
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may be ta.ken as a bedrock proposition in one situation
could in another be an empirical proposition.
Though "bedrock propositions" can not be related to
"to doubt .. or •tto be mistaken" and one incorrectly uses
the expression "I know that ••• " with them, they are
"certain".

Part of the criteria of "bedrock proposition"

is certainty behavior.

To use the example of Lavoisier again, he acted
like a man who had not the slightest doubt that "substance"
means "the sort of thing which reacts in the same way,
under the same circumstances".

One would say of him that

he was convinced of the meaning of the concept "substance".
This conviction he shared with his co-workers.

If someone

approached him who did not share this conviction, one would
expect him to attempt to convince this person.

'rhis attempt

would be ma.de by giving "reasons" and perhaps through other
types of "persuasion".
That the proposition Lavoisier takes as certain is
certain, is not something he decided.

Rat.her, that the

proposition is certain is dependent on its place in the
language-game.

The most prominent grammatical character-

istic of this sort of proposition is that they can not be
mistaken.

In that "making a mistake" is excluded as a

linguistic presupposition of this type of proposition, it

is what Wittgenstein calls "objectively certain".

31
To see this, consider the following.

One of the

criterion of "framework propositions" is that they are
arbitrary.

Their arbitrariness is premised on the fact

that one needs no justification in holding

If

~~em.

there is no need to justify them, then there is no need
to offer one's grounds, evidence, or position for holding them.

Indeed, there are no grounds or evidence

for holding them.

3ut, if there are no grounds or

evidence for them, then there cannot be grounds or evidence which speak against them.

Therefore, one cannot

speak of the possibility of these propositions being
mistaken within the language-game.

We have now completed the explication of Wittgenstein's analysis of certainty as regards the existence
of Physical Objects.

He has developed the thesis that

"bedrock propositions" are such that they can.not be
doubted or mistaken.
held as certain.

They are propositions

whic~

are

Amongst this sort of proposition a.re

those which map out the world of physical object.s.
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